AIR TRANSPORT Revamping the checklist

Briefing better – three years on

Captain RICH LOUDON, Alaska Airlines and Captain DAVID MORIARTY, RAeS HF Group (Flight Operations and Training) follow up their 2017 article in this magazine with a fresh look at briefings inspired by the work of the Human Factors team at Alaska Airlines.

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In August 2017, an article was published in this magazine entitled ‘Briefing Better’. On the AEROSPACE website, it became the most accessed article of the year and helped galvanise the aviation industry into re-examining how flight crew are trained to carry out departure and arrival briefings. The new format that the article recommended was based on the work of the Human Factors team at Alaska Airlines and encouraged airlines to move away from the all-too-common scripted briefing procedures in favour of a more up-to-date approach. Among the recommendations laid out in the article were that departure and arrival briefings should be:

  • Threat-forward – threats being the first thing discussed.
  • Led by the monitoring pilot to encourage interactivity
  • Scalable – Longer or shorter depending on the degree of crew familiarity with the airport in question and the number of perceived threats.

Such was the response to the article that we felt it would be useful to write a follow-up article about how Alaska Airlines had so successfully managed this radical change across its fleet and this was published in September 2018 under the title ‘Changing Course’. These articles are still available online (links at the end of this article) and we would recommend reading them in order to be able to put this article into context.

​Since the publication of the original article, both of us have been contacted by airlines around the world looking for more information about how they could most successfully implement these new techniques in their own operation. So far, 30 different operators have been in touch from a variety of operation types and from many different countries. Among the numerous inquiries we have received, there is one question that many have asked…is it working? By that, they mean, are the pilots performing to the desired standard and is it positively affecting the overall safety at the airline?

The answer to the first question is an easier one, thanks to the work the (Line Operations Safety Audit) LOSA Collaborative did in establishing a methodology to analyse the efficacy of the change and in training the LOSA observers to accurately assess crew performance. We had three primary outcomes we wanted to measure during LOSA observations: did the crew properly anticipate the relevant threats present; was the briefing interactive between both pilots? and was the briefing appropriately scaled given the level of complexity, risk, familiarity, proficiency, etc…present at the time?

A graph showing the number of briefing errors compared to the LOSA archive average over a period of time also tells an interesting story.

Desired outcome 1

Anticipation. According to the LOSA Collaborative, properly anticipating a threat is a two-step process: (1) the crew must first identify the threat as a relevant risk to flight safety and then (2) manage the risk the threat presents by applying an effective countermeasure to maintain an adequate margin of safety. Out of all flights observed, 86% of flight crews adequately anticipated each relevant threat that the LOSA observer indicated was present during the time of the briefing.

Desired outcome 2

Interactive. To meet the standard of ‘interactive’, both pilots had to contribute at some point during the briefing process. Of all briefings observed, 82% of them involved both pilots during the discussion.

Desired outcome 3

Scalability. The typical airline briefing for many decades was a one-size-fits-all, one-sided, rote recitation of a list of required items. What we were seeking was to promote a more scaled approach in which the level of detail of the briefing matched the level of complexity and risk that was present at the time of the briefing. While no empirical measure is available for this desired outcome, the LOSA observers did record a wide variety of detail across the data set. There were observations in which there were numerous threats discussed and a lengthy briefing to a small percentage of flights in which there were no relevant threats discussed and an appropriate scaled-down briefing.

We also asked the LOSA observers to make a subjective assessment of the overall briefing they observed using the following scale below:

Roughly 75% of the briefings were in the Good to Outstanding category with the remainder leaving room for improvement.

A graph showing the number of briefing errors compared to the LOSA archive average over a period of time also tells an interesting story.

The increasing trend in briefing errors was effectively reversed, as the airline identified that the old briefing procedure had lost relevance with the crews and a safer, more effective briefing was established.

Dr Klinect, PhD, CEO, LOSA Collaborative had this to say: “In 2014, we presented our report and Alaska responded with FH Revision 12 [the new briefing]. We have never seen such an effective, industry-leading innovation with as many positive outcomes as were revealed in LOSA 2019.”

While the data from Alaska Airlines is very encouraging, given the range of operators that are moving forward with implementing this new briefing style, we thought it would be useful to get some feedback about their experiences so far. It is our hope that, by sharing the experiences of so many different operators, the lessons they have learned from their successes and setbacks during the process may be useful to others. To this end, we sent a survey out to all the airlines that had contacted us requesting information and asked them to answer some questions that would allow us to see how they were progressing. Their responses make up the basis of this article. While we have not been able to include all of the information sent back in the surveys, we have tried to highlight the most useful data.

Outstanding – Followed the threat-forward format, was interactive with both the PF and PM both contributing, and appropriately scaled.

Good – Followed the threat-forward format, was interactive with both the PF and PM both contributing, but the observer felt there were some details missing.

Poor/Marginal – Inverse of Outstanding/Good ratings. Additionally, the crew did not identify some critical/relevant threats that observers believed needed to be discussed given the conditions and environment.

Flickr/Kent Wien

Part 1

Demographics

All respondents worked for commercial operators which were either exclusively short-haul or mixed short and long-haul. The operations were distributed across North America, Europe and Asia and the respondents were mostly in senior management or training positions. 

Part 2

What stage of implementation have you reached?

Out of all the respondents, a quarter had the new procedures fully implemented. Another quarter were in the initial stages of discussion. The remaining half were in the process of implementation. One respondent stated that they were undertaking a formal study to look at how the new procedures could be best aligned with their Safety Management System processes.

Part 3

What prompted the desire to change your previous briefing procedures?

We were both gratified to read that many respondents had been inspired by the initial work done by Alaska Airlines. Others noted that, in some instances, pilots had begun to omit briefings altogether because of the increasing list of requirements of a ‘successful briefing’. This observation that the old scripted briefing format was viewed as being procedurally compliant but ultimately not relevant was raised by several contributors. One notable response was that it was felt that, if the monitoring pilot was barely playing a role in the briefing, this lack of engagement would likely roll over into the execution of the flight itself. The scalability of the new briefing style was also commented on as a driver for change, ie the ability to shorten the briefing considerably based on crew familiarity with particular airports and benign weather conditions. The desire for flexibility and the major role that the monitoring pilot plays in the Alaska Airlines’ briefing format was a key feature that led so many operators to want to adopt these procedures, as well as putting Threat and Error Management front and centre in the process.

Part 4

What setbacks/resistance have you encountered?

While many respondents said that they had yet to encounter any problems, others talked about the systemic resistance to change that is sometimes encountered, particularly in large organisations. Another respondent noted that, because of multiple changes to their internal management structure, the project kept being postponed and they finally tried to rush the rollout, meaning the time available to create training materials was inadequate. The Covid-19 situation was reported to have understandably slowed the progress of implementation. Some airlines reported that crew were initially resistant to the change, thinking that this was just going to be a temporary fad. However, with reinforcement, the training team were able to successfully establish the new format. One interesting response was a concern raised by a pilot union. They were concerned that, by having the monitoring pilot highlight threats, this could potentially steepen the flight deck gradient, presumably in the case of the captain being pilot monitoring. Additionally, some resistance from management was reported due to resource limitations.

One respondent noted that their airline tried to introduce the new system at a time when many other procedures were changing and encountered what they categorised as ‘change fatigue’. In order to overcome this, the implementation was spread throughout the training programme, presumably to avoid delivering it all in one go.

Part 5

Based on your experiences, what advice would you give to another operator just starting out on this process?

In many ways, these responses were the most important part of the survey and we have presented a selection of them here with only minimal editing to preserve confidentiality and enhance readability:

  •  Get Standards and Training on the same page right away.
  •  Show the reasons (through objective data) that this can mitigate errors. That’s the best buy-in.
  •  Use data to support the need for change.
  •  The CRM team must be involved.
  •  Make a clear case for why the change is necessary.
  •  Set a starting date.
  •  Do a comprehensive literature review prior to approaching leadership.
  •  Review and simplify required departure and approach briefing items.
  •  Getting the pilot community to understand the need for change is a must.
  •  Run a survey.
  •  Actively flying pilots must be involved, not just management pilots who may not do as much flying.
  •  Develop a good change management strategy.
  •  Enlist the help of personnel with academic backgrounds in psychology and sociology (human factors personnel).
  •  Test with a small group.
  •  Enlist the help of a doctorate level researcher.
  •  Explain the reasons why you need to change.
  •  Buy-in and visible support from flight management and trainers is a requirement.
  •  Interview pilots! They have a great deal to say and are probably already scaling their briefings accordingly.
  •  Find an appropriate opportunity to educate crew about the new policy.
  •  Keep an open mind and avoid your own biases.
  •  Try to enlist your national regulator as your partner in the process. You will be educating them.

Alaska Airlines has pioneered this new approach to streamlining checklists. Alaska Airlines

Conclusion

As with so many examples of positive practical advice, simply having a good idea is seldom enough. Alaska Airlines was successful in its endeavour because it was the carrier which was able to take the time to plan its approach and invest time and money in managing this significant change in its flight operations. As more operators try to manage this type of change, so more data will be generated which can help the industry as a whole. Undoubtedly, the Covid crisis will set many airlines back in different ways. However, as we prepare to retake to the skies in ever increasing numbers, we may have a rare opportunity to take advantage of the fact that so many of us will have ‘forgotten our lines’ when it comes to briefings. Now may be the right time to introduce something better.

Resources

Captain Rich Loudon is an Instructor Evaluator and leads the Human Factors Working Group for Alaska Airlines. richard.loudon@alaskaair.com

RAeS Webinar: Pilot Training, is it time to revisit the basics? – RAeS Webinar 22 June 2021, Online, 17:00 – 18:00 BST