Book Reviews

Book Reviews

FOUNDATIONS OF RUSSIAN MILITARY FLIGHT 1885-1925

By James K Libbey

Naval Institute Press, 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, MD 21402, USA. 2019. xii; 250pp. Illustrated. $38. ISBN 978-1-68247-423-5.

Sikorsky Ilya Muromets S-27 type E (Yeh-2) bomber. San Diego Air & Space Museum.

The author is a Professor Emeritus at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University where he taught aviation history and Russian-American relations, so it can be assumed that this book is authoritative. It is also interesting for anyone seeking knowledge of the beginnings of Russian airpower.

Chapter 1 sets the scene and explains Russia’s attempts to modernise, following its defeats in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Reference is made to Alexander Mozhaiskii and his steam-powered aircraft which, in early Soviet days, was portrayed as a pioneering heavier-than-air machine claimed as the forerunner of such machines, whereas the so-called flight was uncontrolled and ended in a crash.

Russian air power began in earnest through the Imperial All-Russian Aero Club and the Farman Model III, which was licence-built in Russia. Dmitri Grigorovich designed and built flying boats and Igor Sikorsky, went to France to study aeronautics. His S-6 won the Russian military competition and Sikorsky became probably the best known Russian aeronaut.

Chapter 2 follows the timeline to the start of WW1 in 1914, then known as the ‘Great War’. At the start of the war the aristocratic background of most of the pilots gave way to accelerated training to make up for losses and deaths in combat missions and accidents. The main training centres at Gatchina and Sevastopol were expanded and new training fields were established in Kiev, Odessa, Omsk, Tashkent, Tiflis and Warsaw. Family background no longer served as a key factor in securing flight school candidates.

The majority of aircraft used by the Russian military were imported, some from the UK and US but mainly Nieuports and Farmans from France, many built in Russia under licence. However, the four-engined Ilya Muromets reconnaissance bomber was designed and built in Russia by Sikorsky.

At the begining of war in 1914, Russia had 40 squadrons but an average of only six aircraft in each. Chapter 3 describes the campaign in the autumn in 1914 and the lack of modern aircraft. The imported Nieuports were already two years old and there was an absence of back-up aircraft. Russia lost 40% of its military aircraft in August 1914 and had to import replacement aircraft and engines. Replacements included imports from the US and Canada, via Vladivostok and had to be transported via the Trans-Siberian Railroad to the front line in Europe. Sikorksky’s four-engined Le Grand was successfully flown in May 1913 but was damaged by the aircraft losing one of its engines which fell onto the Grand’s wings. It was not rebuilt.

Russia lost 40% of its military aircraft in August 1914 and had to import replacement aircraft and engines 

Chapter 4 describes how a bigger four-engine bomber, the Ilya Muromets, was built and proved a success and went into limited production and development in a number of versions. Chapter 5 – ‘Flight during the Great Retreat’ – describes how the supply of arms and equipment to the Third Army was irregular and insufficient and gave rise to a large undefended gap left vulnerable by escaping Russians. The aviation department of the Russian Second Army was called into action with a certain amount of success but the corresponding transfer of Russian activity which drew 16 reserve divisions away from the defensive line which gave rise to the Great Retreat, in spite of the activity the Russian Air Force and their FBA (Franco-British Aviation) flying boats. Alexander de Seversky, to use his Americanised name, was the son of pioneer Russian aviator and brother of his army instructor and became a Naval Pilot on the FBA flying boat but was seriously injured in an attack by German gunboats.

Chapter 6 – ‘The Height of the Air War’: The difference in magnitude of the airborne offensives in the Eastern and Western Fronts was substantial. Germany claimed 7,067 air combat victories in the West but only 358 in the East, in spite of the much greater length of the Eastern Front, from Riga in the North to near Romania in the South. Russia suffered enormous losses of 2.5 million troops killed or captured who had to be replaced and imports of hundreds of millions of dollars-worth of raw materials from the US between 1914 and 1917 and 2,500 aero engines from France, Britain, Italy and the US. The situation was not helped by the Tsar Nikolai II and his wife falling under the influence of the notorious Rasputin whose cronies were given high ministerial positions. Rasputin’s murder by Prince Iusupov came too late to save the Romanov dynasty. The Ilya Muromets conducted 442 combat missions during the war and destroyed 40 enemy aircraft, took 7,000 high quality photographs of enemy positions and dropped more than 2,000 bombs.

Tupolev ANT-4 in the Ulyanovsk Aircraft Museum. Vadim Indeikin.

Chapter 7 – ‘The 1917 Revolution Impacts Squadrons’ – describes how the Russian Black Sea Fleet launched a series of important missions against Turkish sailing ships and mines placed by the fleet and five Russian submarines sank 26 more Turkish vessels. Russian troops made it clear that, although they would fight to defend existing front lines, they would not participate in any new offensives.

The ugly lies and actual truths about the Tsar and the government and massive deaths against an entrenched enemy and German firepower led to rampant inflation and the end of gold as the foundation of Russian currency. This led to large increases in living costs and numerous strikes and work stoppages. In March 1917 protesters against bread shortages and male workers locked out of factories, joined forces and evolved into uncontrolled revolution. The Tsar dissolved the Russian national legislature and then abdicated. This eventually led to a meeting of the Constituent Assembly which was dissolved by the Bolsheviks after one session. During the turmoil Igor Sikorsky departed to France and, in due course, to the US. Russian attacks against Austrian and German troops failed everywhere as military discipline disintegrated and, in some cases, soldiers refused to take part in offensives and this led to the assault on, or murder of, their officers. Ultimately, on 15 December 1917 the Soviet government agreed a ceasefire with the Central Powers. However, the Russians walked out of negotiations on 10 February 1918. The Germans were shocked and began an unopposed offensive.

Chapter 8 – ‘Reds versus Whites’: An armistice was signed between Russia and the central powers, Austria, Germany and Turkey which ended the active fighting but, before a final peace agreement was agreed, the Soviet Government chose not to wait for it, and on 11 February 1918 demobilised the Army and Navy. Neither Sofonov nor Seversky were happy with their roles and Sofonov absconded with a new army Nieuport and, with his bride in the observer’s seat, flew to Finland, which had recently become independent. Seversky, however, made his way to Tokyo and took a passenger ship to San Francisco, thereby avoiding the Russian Civil War between Red (communists led by Lenin) and Trotsky’s Whites (anti-communists). Grigorovich, alone among the major aircraft designers, remained in Soviet Russia and, in due course, after five years, resumed designing and building aircraft. Trotsky was banished and replaced by Stalin in 1927 and ultimately ended up in Mexico City, where he was murdered by a Soviet agent in 1940.

Chapter 9 – ‘Aviation and the Civil War’: In January 1919 there were enough Russian pilots to create two Slavic-British Aviation squadrons, as well as three squadrons manned only by English pilots, which enjoyed superiority over the two Soviet squadrons. The Soviet pilots flew Soviet-built Sopwith 1½ Strutters built in the Dukh (Dux) factory, renamed GAZ-1, which managed to produce over 100 1½ Strutters, between 1918 and 1923. However, the Red Air Force had about 350 aircraft of various types and held the Russian heartland with urban centres, industries and railways and an abundance of population, hardware and troops, which ultimately prevailed. Morale among the Americans, British and French troops plunged and they failed to understand why their Russian Allies had become the enemy.

By 1920, in essence, the White Army no longer existed, following the Soviet peace treaties with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland, formerly part of the Imperial Russian Empire, leaving Red Army forces outnumbering the White troops by four to one. Chapter 10 – ‘Soviet Victories in 1920 and 1921’: The Red Army had evolved into a massive, well-armed and effective fighting force. The White Army could not replace casualties or match the firepower of the Soviet military and behind it were large territories it could not control. The British disbanded the two RAF Squadrons that had been sent earlier.

The Red Army had to deal not only with the White Army but also with a Polish invasion. However, a change of policy ensured that the Red Air Force concentrated its forces to obtain overwhelming air superiority by the end of 1919. This increased during 1920, the Red Army’s superiority over the White’s patched together aircraft in its inventory. In November there was a mass exodus of White Army personnel from the Crimea.

Russia suffered from a weak industrial structure, an inadequate transport system, limited technological progress and a cumbersome and corrupt Tsarist government

Chapter 11 – ‘Aircraft Development 1918-1924’: At the conclusion of the Civil War, the Red Air Force had 325 aircraft in 54 detachments plus 13 units of various seaplanes with the technical backing of the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI in Russian) established by N E Zhukovski. Anton Tupolev designed the ANT-4, the world’s first twin-engine all metal monoplane bomber, in 1924. Stalin’s message to the Politburo in August 1920 was to concentrate on well-performing military aircraft. The All-Russian Cooperative Society Ltd (ARCOS) was established in London with a Branch in the US. Other early Russian aircraft designers of note were Igor Grigorvich, designer of the I-Z, Igor Sikorsky, designer of the Ilya Muromets series as well as the S-16 and S-20 fighters and Sergei Ilyushin, designer of the Avro 504-based U-1. 

Fokker in Germany, designed and built the DVII which was a great success but Germany still lost the war and Fokker returned to his native Netherlands, with a substantial number of smuggled DVIIs, half of which were sold to the Soviets in 1924. The Soviet government purchased a further 50 DXI, a development of the DVII. As Germany was not permitted to produce military aircraft, it administered training sites in Russia, including aircraft, at Lipetsk.

France played a major role in the formation of Russian development of military flight. Russia admits that only Igor Sikorsky and Dmitri Grigorovich deserve recognition for four-engined reconnaissance bombers and flying boats, respectively. Russia suffered from a weak industrial structure, an inadequate transport system, limited technological progress and a cumbersome and corrupt Tsarist government.

The Bolshevik phase of the Russian Revolution gave rise to the armistice and then the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Bolsheviks, soon renamed communists, waged class warfare against the bourgeoisie and nobility, and aircraft designers, such as Sikorsky and pilots like Alexander de Seversky fled from the former Russian Empire. Pilots from the middle and lower classes aligned themselves with the Soviet movement and members of the nobility joined the Anti-Red Whites who sought an end to communist rule.

Nikolai Zhukovski’s TsAGI became the most important and productive aeronautical research establishment in Soviet Russia. Andrei Tupolev worked with Zhukovski to create a multi engine aircraft to replace the Ilya Muromets. Nikolai Grigorvich, Nikolai Polikarpov and Sergei Ilyushin remained in Russia and helped in the development of modern aircraft. Germany secretly set up an aircraft factory in Russia which supplied the Russians with modern aircraft and technology and the Germans with the ability to construct military aircraft and train pilots, despite the restrictions in the Treaty of Versailles.

Nigel Eastaway
OBE ARAeS 

BASIC SCIENCE AND ART OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE RECONSTRUCTION

By Donald F Knutson

SAE International, 162pp, 2019, £92.50.

The reconstructed wreckage of TWA 800, stored at Calverton Executive Airpark by the NTSB, May 1997. This aircraft had exploded shortly after take-off from New York on a flight to Rome. The report’s conclusion was that the probable cause of the accident was the explosion of flammable fuel vapours in the centre fuel tank. NTSB.

The author has both flying and airframe/powerplant experience with medium and large public transport aircraft, and his expertise shows throughout this book, which I found to be a useful refresher on basic investigation techniques. The title reflects the fact that sometimes the work resembles an art as much as a science and it was refreshing to see in Chapter 2 that ‘physical evidence is king’. Often it is assumed that data recorders are essential to the investigation, yet sometimes the information they contain is corrupted or misleading and witnesses can be mistaken. Careful wreckage analysis is often the only or the final recourse.

Some of the subjects covered – witness statements, crashworthiness, impact forces, human factors and the ‘see and avoid’ concept, for example, may seem surprising but they are all areas where the investigator who is ‘kicking tin’ must have a degree of expertise. The author introduces these matters with clarity and accuracy. His description of an initial visual appraisal without touching anything and his comments about the theft of wreckage are the practical considerations of an experienced investigator in the immediate aftermath of an accident.

I found this to be an excellent and useful book, ideally suited as a reference for accident investigation training courses

This book is written from an American perspective but takes due account of practices in other states. I imagine the comments about investigations being ineffective unless the Investigator in Charge (IIC) is on the scene (p 25) will raise eyebrows with investigators in the UK. In the US the local FAA office often investigates and reports back but, in the UK, teams of experienced investigators are deployed by the IIC who may or may not accompany them.

I found this to be an excellent and useful book, ideally suited as a reference for accident investigation training courses and a useful aid to practitioners. It is not another ‘air crash detective’ book but will appeal instead to government and industry investigators, technical staff who may become involved with aircraft accidents and those with a general interest.

Alan Simmons
FRAeS